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1. BETWEEN THE HUMAN AND THE INHUMAN
In humanitarian ideology life itself has become the object of governance. Contrary
to the great ideologies of nationalism and imperialism, humanitarianism is con-
cerned not so much with the proper way of living for a group of people as with life
as such. Indeed, it would be possible to say that life is considered mainly passively
as something to be saved, but without any political voice and historical destination.
The inclusion of pure life in politics logically entails the idea that all human beings
possess a certain senseofhumanity towhichotherhumanbeingshaveanobligation
to respond. In this view, life itself is considered to be the lowest common denomin-
ator of otherwise completely different human beings. Moreover, the humanitarian
concernwith life itself turns the question of life and how it is deﬁned into one of the
most crucial of our time.
In his recent essay The Open: Man and Animal, Giorgio Agamben, one of Italy’s
most important philosophical thinkers, picks up on the theme of life through a
critical, if sometimes slightly haphazard, examinationof thenotionof thehuman in
Westernthought.Hismainargument is that thehumanis theproductofaseparation
between humanity and animality that takes place within man himself and which
elevateshuman life aboveanimal life,which in turn is excludedas somethingabject.
For Agamben, the question of determining the boundary between human life and
animal life isnot justamatterofphilosophicalconcernbuthasadirectbearingonthe
fundamental political question of how to distinguish between valuable life on
the onehand and life that is not considered to beworthy of the predicate ‘human’ on
the other. As such, his discussion is also relevant for discourses of international law
and international politics that assert a universal notion of humanity as reference
point for human rights, human security, and humanitarian intervention.
Agamben begins his inquiry into the connection between man and animal, the
human and the non-human, with a brief discussion of a picture in a thirteenth-
century Hebrew bible which depicts themessianic banquet of the righteous – those
who have survived the end of days because they have lived a kosher life. In this
picture the righteous are depicted with animal heads. Agamben takes this to mean
that on the last day ‘the relations between animals and men will take on a new
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form, and that man himself will be reconciled with his animal nature’ (p. 3). The
idea of a reconciliation between man and animal at the end of days is continued in
Agamben’s account of a – rather peculiar – exchange between Koje`ve and Bataille,
bothofwhomtheorized about ‘the endof history and theﬁgure thatmanandnature
would assume in the post-historical world’ (p. 6). Koje`ve originally theorized in a
Hegelian fashion that the end of history would involve man’s return to animality.
Later, however, he modiﬁed his position, not only claiming that humanity would
survive the end of history but also that humanity only exists in contradistinction to
animality:
[I]n Koje`ve’s reading of Hegel, man is not a biologically deﬁned species, nor is he a sub-
stance given once and for all; he is, rather, a ﬁeld of dialectical tensions always already
cutby internalcaesurae thatevery timeseparate–at leastvirtually– ‘anthropophorous’
animality and the humanity which takes bodily form in it. (p. 12)
This leads Agamben to conclude that the category of man is inherently unstable
and always haunted by the spectre of the animal, for man ‘can be human only to
the degree that he transcends and transforms the anthropophorous animal which
supportshim’ (p. 12). Theanimal thus functionsas akindof constitutiveoutside that
is both at the very core of human life and external to it. Agamben traces the paradox
that the animal is both the human’s condition of possibility and its condition of
impossibility back toAristotle’s notionof the ‘political animal’, whichbearswitness
both to the grounding of the human in the animal and the subsequent deﬁnition
of the human through its subtraction from the animal within man. Rather than
deﬁning life, Aristotle looks for its lowest common denominator fromwhich other,
higher forms of life can be articulated and evaluated. This most basic form of life is
referred to as nutritive life, that is, the organic or biological potentiality to grow that
is common tohumans and animals aswell as to plants. Thenotionof the living body
as oscillating between nutritive life andmore complex forms of life takes place ﬁrst
of all withinman himself, where life is constantly divided, categorized, and decided
upon.
Having established that the separation of the human and the animal withinman
can be witnessed in ancient Greek philosophy and the divine, Agamben shifts his
focus to the biological sciences. Although his steps (or rather leaps) between differ-
ent disciplines, traditions, and ages at times come across as somewhat arbitrary –
not least becauseAgamben does not develop his argument systematically according
to a pre-established plan – his decision to focus on the biosciences is an interesting
move, since these sciences have spent much energy on delimiting the human from
theanimal. If anything, itwouldhavebeen interesting ifAgambenhadexpandedhis
discussion on biology somewhat by addressing current research in the genetic sci-
ences andneuroscienceswhichclaim toprovide a set of ‘hard-wired’ constraints that
any theory on human ﬂourishing needs to take into account.1 Agamben, however,
1. See for instance L. Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature (1998); S. Pinker,
The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature (2002). For interesting political-theoretical accounts of
neurology, see W. E. Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (2002); B. Massumi, ‘The Autonomy of
Affect’, in P. Patton (ed.),Deleuze: A Critical Reader (1996), 217–39.
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focuses mainly on the Swedish biologist Linnaeus, who, writing in the eighteenth
century, developed a classiﬁcation system in which he classiﬁes man among the
primates, because he can ﬁnd little physical difference between men and apes. Fur-
thermore, Linnaeusmaintained that the later additionof sapiens to the generic name
Homo should, rather than meaning wise or knowledgeable, be understood as man’s
ability to recognise himself as such: ‘man is the animal that must recognize itself as
human in order to be human’ (p. 26, emphasis in original).
Bywayof summary, then,Agambendistils twodistinctways inwhich thehuman
and the animal have been separated inWestern thought. First, he points at ancient
attempts to humanize the animal and to provide it with a human face. In this
context, he argues that the human is constructed by reaching out to the animal, by
including animality within man: ‘the non-man is produced by the humanization
of an animal: the man-ape, the enfant sauvage or Homo ferus, but also and above all
the slave, the barbarian, and the foreigner, as ﬁgures of an animal in human form’
(p. 37). The second instance where humanity meets animality takes place with the
animalization of the human in modern times. Here Agamben draws our attention
to the non-speaking man who functions as the imaginary evolutionary interval
betweenmute animals on the one hand andman as a speaking subject on the other.
In this case, the origin of man is equated with the origin of language, forcing man’s
muteness outsidehimself. The inhuman is thusproducedwithinman itself: ‘the Jew,
that is, the non-man producedwithin theman, or the ne´omort and the overcomatose
person, that is, the animal separated within the human body itself’ (p. 36).
Having argued that the human and the animal are intimately linkedwithinman
himself, Agamben turns his attention to the ontological status of the animal en-
vironment and that of the human world in an attempt to enquire further into the
threshold between the human and the animal. By comparing the animal environ-
ment to the human world, Agamben seeks to provide an account that recognizes
the intimate connection between the two andwhich does not constitute the human
throughan exclusionof some life as non-human. Thus even thoughAgambenmain-
tains that there is a substantial difference between the animal environment and
the human world, this distinction is not hierarchical. In exploring the ontological
status of the animal environment, Agamben takes a point of departure in the work
of the zoologist Jakob von Uexku¨ll, who argues that there is not one world with
hierarchically ordered organisms but an inﬁnite variety of perceptual worlds. In
contrast to the view that that animals move in the same surroundings (Umgebung)
as humans, he argues that the living sphere of an animal is constituted solely by
those environmental elements (Umwelt) that have an affective bearing on the an-
imal. Everything else is simply unable to penetrate its Umwelt. Agamben refers to
Jakob von Uexku¨ll’s example of the tick, which is only able to enter into relation-
ship with a few environmental elements (temperature of the mammal, the odour
of butyric acid, and skin type) and is passionately united with these three elements
only: ‘The tick is the relationship; she lives only in it and for it’ (p. 47). In this view, an
animal is completely open to its disinhibitors, that is, the animal is completely ab-
sorbed by its environment and is, therefore, held out in something other than itself.
Following Heidegger, Agamben argues that this openness is also not open, because
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the animal has no ability to apprehend its own disinhibitors and, as such, is also
closed off from its environment: ‘the animal environment . . . is offen (open) but not
offenbar (‘disconcealed’, lit. openable)’ (p. 55). Thus, as Heidegger already argued, the
core difference betweenman and animal is that the latter cannot apprehend its own
captivation, whereas the human is able to break free of his or her all-encapsulating
environment.
However, this is not to say that thehuman thereby enters into amore enlightened
space beyond the limits of the animal environment. On the contrary, the ‘discon-
cealment’ that is characteristic of being in theworld of humans can only be attained
through a suspension or deactivation of the human’s relationship with its disinhib-
itors.HenceHeidegger’s point thatman’sLichtung is at the same time also aNichtung:
‘theworldhas becomeopen formanonly through the interruption andnihilationof
the living being’s relationship with its disinhibitor’ (pp. 69–70). Agamben refers to
Heidegger’s description of profound boredom as the emotional state where being in
the humanworldmeets animal existence. If we are bored, we do not actively engage
with our environment, but neither can we escape it. Rather, in the case of boredom,
we are completely captivated by the environment from which there is no escape.
Yet, in contrast to the animal, the fact thatwe are not engagedwith the environment
also means that it is possible to disturb or suspend our intimate relationship to
this environment. Or as Agamben nicely puts it, ‘Dasein is simply an animal that
has learned to become bored; it has awakened from its own captivation to its own
captivation. This awakening of the living being to its own being-captivated, this
anxious and resolute opening to a not-open, is the human’ (p. 70, emphasis in ori-
ginal). The humanonly obtains its humanity through the internal struggle between
concealment (which characterizes the animal environment) and disconcealment
(which characterizes being in the world, Dasein). At this point Agamben returns to
theopening themeof the essay: the status of humanity at the endofhistory. Building
onHeidegger’s notion thatman is always oscillating between animal concealedness
and human disconcealedness, he claims that the end of history leads not so much
to a reconciliation of humanity and animality, but, on the contrary, according to
Agamben the synthesis between thehumanand the animal leads to a humanization
of the animal or an animalization of the human in which ‘bare life’, the threshold
between animal existence and human existence, itself becomes the object of
politics.
2. THE END OF HISTORY: BARE LIFE, THE CAMP, AND BIOPOLITICS
Arguably, the notion of bare life as a zone of indistinctness between the human and
the animal is the most important political theme in Agamben’s work. As he puts it
inTheOpen, ‘In our culture, the decisivepolitical conﬂict,whichgoverns every other
conﬂict, is that between the animality and humanity of man. That is to say, in its
origin Western politics is also biopolitics’ (p. 80). Bare life is the limit of humanity,
the point where the human turns into the inhuman. The production of humanity
is at the same time also the suspension ofman’s own animality, which is thought of
as pure abandonment: ‘Whatwould thus be obtained, however, is neither an animal
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life nor a human life, but only a life that is separated and excluded from itself – only
a bare life’ (p. 38, emphasis in original).
Here itmight be useful to recall Agamben’s example of the tick,which only exists
in a passionate and intimate symbiosis with its speciﬁc disinhibitors. Whereas
normally only humans can suspend their relation to their environment, Agamben
refers to a laboratory experiment in which a tick was kept alive in isolation from
its affective environment for eighteen years. Living in suspension, that is, in an
environment that had nothing to offer it, the life of the tick bears resemblance to
the human state of profound boredom. Nevertheless, while the tick thus in a sense
ceases to be an animal, it is equally impossible to allocate the tick to the category of
humanity. Rather, deprived of its environment, the life of the tick is an example of
bare life that, neither human nor animal, constitutes a threshold which is nothing
more or less than a state of being simply a living being.
Although Agamben repeatedly hints at the political importance of bare life and
biopolitics in theessayunder review,heunfortunatelydoesnotdescribe this relation
to the same extent as in his earlier work. Especially in his book Homo Sacer. Sover-
eign Power and Bare Life, Agamben argues convincingly that Western sovereignty
gives birth to the bare life of Homo sacer. Following Carl Schmitt, Agamben claims
that the sovereign decides not only who is included in the legal order as human
subjects but also who is refused entry to the rule-governed order. Sovereignty thus
simultaneously creates inside and outside, order and anarchy, city and forest, and
humanity and animality. Indeed, if the sovereign can be deﬁned by his ability to put
himself above the law, Homo sacer represents life beneath the law, that is, life that
can be endedwithout punishment. In this context, Agamben refers to thewerewolf,
a fusion of man and animal, as the ﬁgure of bare life that bears the sovereign’s ban:
‘What had to remain in the collective unconscious as a monstrous hybrid, divided
between the forest and the city – the werewolf – is, therefore, in its origin the ﬁgure
of the man who has been banned from the city’.2
The archetypal place where one encounters life that is reduced to bare life is the
concentration camp. The concentration camp represents a zone of indistinction in
whichhumanityandanimalityblur intooneandwhere life anddeathdependnoton
legal rules but on the goodwill of the campguards,who can act as sovereign vis-a`-vis
the inhabitants of the camp. The status of the bare life in the concentration camps
is meticulously documented in Agamben’s Remnants of Auschwitz. The Witness and
the Archive. In this book Agamben focuses especially on the so-calledMuselma¨nner,
a term used by prisoners in Auschwitz to describe those prisoners who no longer
cared whether they lived or died. For Agamben, theMuselmann testiﬁes to the limit
condition of humanity, the threshold beyond which human beings cease to be
human: ‘TheMuselmann is not only or not so much a limit between life and death;
rather, he marks the threshold between the human and the inhuman’.3
If originally the camp was an exclusive, secret space surrounded by walls that
divided social life within the political community from the bare life in the camps,
2. G. Agamben,Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998), 105.
3. G. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz. TheWitness and the Archive (1999), 55.
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Agamben argues that theﬁgure of bare life has now transgressed the spatiotemporal
boundaries of the camp: ‘Today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the
fundamental biopolitical paradigmof theWest’.4 Biopolitics, or soAgamben argues,
does not work towards some political objective but is rather an apolitical project
concerned with the survival of bare life. In contrast to the political tasks, what is
at stake in biopolitics is nothing but the bare life of people. If in modernity the
human was produced by distinguishing it from lower forms of life, contemporary
biopolitics, for instanceapparent inhumanitarian ideology, doesnotproducehigher
forms of living but takes its point of departure in the simple fact of living itself. If the
dialectical motor of history, as Koje`ve argued, was the constant struggle of deciding
between man’s animality and humanity, then biopolitics constitutes the end of
history.Without any historical objectives, the human is thought of as bare life: ‘The
stakes are now different and much higher, for it is a question of taking on as a task
the very factical existence of peoples, that is, in the last analysis, their bare life’
(p. 76). The end of great ideologies thus also seems to have rid humanity of any
historical efﬁcacy, as a result of which the only political mandate left seems to be
the administration of man’s own animality.
Tobesure,Agambendoesnotargueinfavourofareturntothepolitics thatassume
a historical destination of peoples. Indeed, as he argues, these types of politics can
only arrive at their destiny by distinguishing themselves, often violently, from those
forms of living that are considered to be inhuman. However, according to Agamben
the only real ethical stance is the one that does not deny the humanity of those
who have moved beyond the line that separates human life from animal life. In
opposition to the modern production of the human which establishes a boundary
between conscious life andvegetative life, a genuinehumanismwould instead draw
attention to the insufﬁciency of the limit of humanity as well as to the operations
through which the human becomes divided from inhuman or animal life. Such
humanism, moreover, recognizes bare life as the threshold between animality and
humanity. Because bare life bears witness to the precariousness of the human,
Agamben maintains that true humanism does not seek to deﬁne and decide over
life, but, instead, investigates how the humanhas been articulated and rearticulated
at the expense of bare life. To quote Agamben at some length:
[I]f the caesura between the human and the animal passes ﬁrst of all withinman, then
it is the very question of man – and of ‘humanism’ – that must be posed in a new
way . . .Wemust investigate not the metaphysical mystery of conjunction, but rather
the practical and political mystery of separation . . . It is more urgent to work on these
divisions, to ask in what way – within man – man has been separated from non-man,
and the animal from the human, than it is to take positions on the great issues, on
so-called human rights and values. (p. 16)
What is important for Agamben, then, is not to provide an alternative and more
authoritative distinction between the human and the non-human. Nor does he aim
to provide a deﬁnition of vegetative life as the lowest common denominator shared
4. See Agamben, supra note 2, at 181.
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between human beings and which, for exactly that reason, constitutes the logical
starting point for humanitarian ideologists. Rather, Agamben seeks to circumvent
the paradox of the humanization of the animal and the animalization of the human
by ﬁnding a third space of being that does not draw a line between the human and
the non-human.
3. HUMAN RIGHTS OR THE RIGHT TO BE HUMAN?
From the vantage point of international legal theory, it is somewhat disappointing
that Agamben does not discuss the biopolitics inherent in humanitarianism in
more detail. For while he explicitly lists humanitarian ideology as one of the main
processes that contribute to the production of bare life at the end of history, he does
not discuss inwhichways humanitarianismdraws the line between the human and
the non-human in any speciﬁc sense. This is unfortunate. It would for instance have
been interesting to see how Agamben would have engaged with the fact that the
structure of the camp has made a comeback in the name of humanitarianism and
human rights.5 For while completely different in purpose, both refugee camps
and extermination camps are characterized by the presence of bare life. A second
and related topic worth exploring would have been the role victimization plays
in humanitarian ideology. Victims are often represented as innocent, whereas the
humanitarian operation itself is depicted as impartial and apolitical. While it is
no doubt easier to make political choices when the division between villains and
victims seems clear-cut, such a stance also denies political agency to those whose
life is taken care of.6 A third and ﬁnal topic Agamben could have discussed in more
detail concerns the relationship between political rights of citizenship on the one
hand and human rights on the other. Increasingly, human rights are viewed as
something that transgresses the borders of particular nation-states and the rights
of man are increasingly separated from the rights of citizens. This, too, seems to
illustrate the fact that the victim or the refugee can only be grasped in terms of
bare life without any relation to a political milieu. This separation, however, also
exempliﬁes that in practice human rights can only functionwhen they are based on
political rights. The idea of human rights as a universal backdropmakes little sense,
since it does not enable those persons to exercise their rights in any meaningful
way. As Hannah Arendt suggests (and is approvingly quoted by Agamben), ‘The
conception of human rights based upon the assumed existence of a human being
as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it
5. Noll has extended Agamben’s discussion on sovereignty, bare life, and the camp to the humanitarian
ﬁeld of asylum protection. See G. Noll, ‘Visions of the Exceptional: Legal and Theoretical Issues Raised
by Transit Processing Centres and Protection Zones’, (2003) 5 European Journal of Migration and Law 303;
see also J. Edkins, ‘Sovereign Power, Zones of Indistinction and the Camp’, (2000) 25 Alternatives 3; C.
Bagge Laustsen and B. Diken, ‘Camping’ as Contemporary Strategy – From Refugee Camps to Gated Com-
munities, AMID Working Paper Series 32 (2003), available at http://www.amid.dk/pub/papers/AMID 32-
2002 Diken & %20Bagge Laustsen.pdf.
6. See Agamben, supra note 2, at 133–4; D. Rieff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis (2002), 25; S.
Zˇizˇek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real. Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates (2002), 91–2; J. Edkins,
‘Humanitarianism, Humanity, Human’, (2003) 2 Journal of Human Rights 253.
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were for theﬁrst time confrontedwithpeoplewhohad indeed lost all other qualities
and speciﬁc relationships – except that they were still human’.7
For Agamben, then, the most important thing is not to articulate the human
(which always also produces the non-human) but to move beyond both human
being and animal being to a state of ‘just being’ or what he in earlier work has
referred to as ‘whatever being’.8 This in turn requires that we risk ourselves in the
emptinessbetweenmanandanimal: ‘Torenderinoperativethemachinethatgoverns
our conceptionofmanwill thereforemeanno longer to seeknew–more effective or
authentic – articulations, but rather to show the central emptiness, the hiatus that –
withinman – separatesman and animal, and to risk ourselves in this emptiness: the
suspension of the suspension, Shabbat of both animal andman’ (p. 92).
Unfortunately, though, Agamben does not expand on what this abstract passage
might imply in practice. This is due partly, as he himself recognizes, to the fact that a
notion of being that suspends both animality and humanity is beyond imagination.
But although there might not be a name for that what is beyond the suspension of
animality and humanity, it is, by way of conclusion, not completely impossible to
translatetheseabstractnotionsintoapoliticalstrategy.Acknowledgingtheexistence
of bare life, such strategy would not start with the notion of human rights but with
the right to be human. In this view, humanitarianism does not have its existence
in protecting life in the name of an abstract universalism (human rights, human
security,andsoon); rather,atrulyhumanehumanismconcretelylocatesuniversality
inbare life, that is, thosewhoaremost excluded. For the truemeasure of universality
lies in theway inwhichhumansubjectswithin thepositiveorder relate to theabjects
of that order. In contrast to the idea of human rights as an abstract prerequisite for
political rights, the right to be human refers to the continuous political process by
which those whose lives have been reduced to bare life are recognized as part of the
political sphere of existence. The true political task for humanitarians is thus not so
much to secure for all individuals a claim to a set of rights recognized as human but
constantly to ﬁght for societal forms that can include the excluded.
Rens vanMunster*
Go¨ran Sluiter, International Criminal Adjudication and the Collection of Evidence: Obliga-
tions of States, School of Human Rights Research 16, Antwerp, Oxford, andNewYork,
Intersentia, 2002, ISBN 9050952275, 464 pp.,€69.00.
DOI: 10.1017/S0922156504222270
No other area in the international ﬁeld is getting as much scholarly attention these
days as international criminal law. In the ten years since their creation, the ad hoc
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda have produced more case law
7. Quoted in Agamben, supra note 2, at 126.
8. G. Agamben, The Coming Community (1993).
* Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark (e-mail:
rvm@sam.sdu.dk).
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than all the previous international and domestic war crimes trials combined, and
their success has led to the recent creation of a permanent International Criminal
Court (ICC).Numerousbooks andhundreds of law reviewarticles have alreadybeen
written about the tribunals and the ICC.While most of the existing scholarship fo-
cusesonthesubstantive law,defences, and jurisdictional reachof these international
criminal courts, Go¨ran Sluiter’s book constitutes the ﬁrst in-depth treatment of one
of the most important aspects of international criminal proceedings: the collection
of evidence.
Evidence is the backbone of a criminal case. This is as true in the international
arena as it is for domestic prosecutions. Yet, unlike national courts trying domestic
cases, the ad hoc tribunals and ICC do not possess a constabulary to collect evidence
and enforce summonses for the appearance of witnesses. Instead, by design, these
international tribunals must depend on the assistance of states, without which no
case could come to trial. In this respect, the tribunals are analogous to national
court proceedings involving evidence located in a foreign state.While there ismuch
precedent and several excellent scholarlyworks on the subject of judicial assistance
between states, there are, as Sluiter ably demonstrates, fundamental differences
between co-operation in criminal matters between states and co-operation with
international criminal tribunals.
At the national level, evidence can be obtained from abroad employing one of
three methods. First, domestic courts can unilaterally order entities within their
jurisdiction to produce evidence in their control abroad or face sanctions. Thus a
court can order a bank located within its territorial jurisdiction to produce records
held at a foreign branch or a corporation to produce records held by a foreign
subsidiary. Second, courts can request evidence from abroad under the principles
of comity and reciprocity, but in such cases the requested authorities have wide
discretion to deny a request for assistance. Third, where applicable, courts can
employ mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs), which require the provision of
assistance except in certain narrowly deﬁned circumstances, such as where the
evidence would threaten national security.
Unlike domestic courts, the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC do not have the ability
unilaterally to enforce sanctions on non-complying entities, since none are within
their jurisdiction.
Inprinciple, allUNmember stateswithout exceptionare required tocomply fully
with requests of the ad hoc international tribunals for assistance, by virtue of their
establishment by the Security Council under its Chapter VII powers. In reality, the
tribunals have no enforcement power of their own, and must rely on the Security
Council to impose sanctions on non-complying countries. The tribunals have been
reluctant to request SecurityCouncil intervention, andwhere theyhavedone so, the
Council has condemnednon-compliance but has to date never authorized sanctions
to induce compliance, rendering co-operation with the ad hoc tribunals in effect
every bit as voluntary and discretionary as a domestic request based on comity.
While the ICCdoesnothavethepowerof theSecurityCouncilbehindit (except in
cases referred to it by the Council), its statute does contain an MLAT-like provision
requiring states parties to comply with requests for assistance except in certain
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circumstances.AsSluiter explains,however, these exceptionsare somewhatbroader
than those enumerated in a typical MLAT, thereby giving states parties a bit more
discretion to deny the ICC’s requests for assistance. At the same time, many of the
traditional exceptions codiﬁed in MLATs are not available under the ICC statute.
Since comity applies only between sovereigns, states that have not ratiﬁed the
ICC Statute are generally free to ignore the ICC’s requests for assistance altogether,
although other international instruments might imply a duty to co-operate under
certain circumstances.
Thus past precedent and writings concerning inter-state legal assistance do not
provide sufﬁcient illumination as to what duties states owe in co-operating with
the international tribunals and what co-operation is required under what circum-
stances. This, then, is the ambitious task Sluiter sets for his book. Drawing on the
precedentof theadhoctribunals, thenegotiatingrecordof therelevant international
instruments, andanalogies to inter-state co-operation, Sluiter’s insightful analysis of
these questions will undoubtedly inﬂuence the future practice of the international
criminal courts.
In undertaking this task, Sluiter also examines a broader question: whether the
duty of states to co-operate with the international tribunals is adequate to provide
them with a sufﬁcient amount of evidence effectively and fairly to determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused. In Sluiter’s opinion, the jury is still out on the
answer to that question. Yet, as an advocate of international justice, he sets forth
several proposals that, if adopted, would probably improve the evidence-gathering
process for the international tribunals.
Sluiter’s book is divided into two main parts. The ﬁrst part (chapters 2 to 6)
concerns the basis and scope of the duty of states to co-operate in the collection
of evidence in general, while the second part (chapters 7 and 8) focuses on the
duty with respect to on-site collection of testimonial evidence – something which
will be particularly important for the effective functioning of the tribunals. In this
reviewer’s opinion, amore logical divisionmight have been between the procedural
aspects and substantive aspects of theduty to co-operate, but Sluiter does a thorough
job of covering these issues as they arise within his organizational structure. He
also skilfully explores the distinctions between the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC
throughout the book.
Following the introduction, chapter 2 offers an identiﬁcation and analysis of the
legal basis for the adhoc tribunals and the ICC to request various formsof judicial as-
sistance and the legal basis of the duty of states to provide such assistance. Chapter 3
examines the distinctions between the legal assistance regimes of the ad hoc
tribunals and the ICC on the one hand, and inter-state provision of legal assist-
ance on the other. Chapter 4 examines the question as to under what circumstances
and conditions the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC may lawfully request assistance.
Chapter 5 examines the procedural and substantive aspects of the duty of states to
co-operate with the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, as well as valid grounds justifying
refusal to provide assistance, and explores howdisputes over the content of the duty
to co-operate should be settled. Chapter 6 concerns the execution of requests for
assistance, exploring in particular the question of the extent to which states have a
BOOK REVIEWS 843
duty to execute requests in a manner dictated by the international court. Chapter 7
identiﬁes the needs of the international courts to obtain testimonial evidence, and
examines themethods available to the international courts to obtain such evidence.
Chapter 8 identiﬁes alternatives to legal assistance, focusing especially on the use of
on-site investigations.
Theﬁnal chapter adroitly sumsup theauthor’s observations, andprovides anum-
berof extremelyuseful recommendations. Sluiterwarns states thatmanytraditional
objections to co-operation recognized in the bilateral context will not be acceptable
with respect to the international tribunals. He notes that the ICC structure suffers
fromcompromisesmadeduring thenegotiations, leaving stateswith amore limited
duty toaccepton-site investigations thanwith respect to theadhoc tribunals. Sluiter
expresses concern that defendants appearing before the international tribunals lack
tools of the kind that are provided to the prosecution and are necessary to gather
exculpatory evidence located in various states. Ultimately, Sluiter concludes that
the most important amendments needed to improve the ICC’s co-operation regime
are the exclusion of the principle of voluntary appearance of witnesses and the
expansion of states parties’ duties in the ﬁeld of on-site investigations.
The writing and editing of this book are superb. Despite the technical nature of
its subject matter, it is extremely readable. The organization (with chapters divided
intonumbered sections and subsections), and thedetailed index, tableof treaties and
table of cases – render this a remarkably easy-to-use reference book. Moreover, the
use of footnotes, rather than endnotes, will be appreciated by both the scholar and
practitioner. Sluiter had already distinguished himself in the ﬁeld of international
criminal law as co-editor of the widely cited series Annotated Leading Cases of
International Criminal Tribunals. This book conﬁrms his expertise in the ﬁeld
of international criminal law. International Criminal Adjudication and the Collection of
Evidence:ObligationsofStates isamust-read foranyseriousscholarof the international
criminal tribunals. Since itspublication ithas alreadygainedworldwide recognition
as one of the most important books written in this ﬁeld.
Michael P. Scharf *
Christian Reus-Smit (ed.), The Politics of International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2004, ISBN 0521837669 (hb), 0521546710 (pb), 334 pp., £40.00 (hb),
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A few years ago, International Organization published a special issue on the ‘Legaliz-
ation ofWorld Politics’.1 In this special issue some leading scholars in international
relations (IR) theory and international law (such as Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler,
* Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, Cleveland, Ohio.
1. (2000) 54 (3) International Organization.
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Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter) sought to explain the move to law in
many areas in international life. The issue of legalization was primarily framed in
terms of legal institutions as answers to functional problems,while lawwas primar-
ily understood as a constraint on the actions of states. Moreover, the ‘legalization
of politics’ was measured in terms of the degree to which rules are obligatory, the
precision of rules, and the delegation to a third party of powers of interpretation,
monitoring, and implementation.
The Politics of International Law can be read as a critique of and an alternative to the
liberal andrationalist approachused in ‘TheLegalizationofWorldPolitics’.Theseap-
proaches, ChristianReus-Smit argues, give a distorted picture of the role of law in in-
ternational life. Law, after all, is not just a constraining factor for utility-maximizing
agents; it is also constitutive of the agents’ identities and their interpretationofwhat
counts as self-interest in theﬁrst place. In earlier publicationsReus-Smit had already
stressed the mutually constitutive relationship of international law and inter-
national politics, for example in his article, ‘Politics and International Obligation’,
and in his book, TheMoral Purpose of the State.2 Building on Reus-Smit’s earlier work
andborrowingfrominsights formulatedinsocialconstructivism,3ThePolitics of Inter-
national Law emphasizes two important ways in which normative structures (like
law) are constitutive of the actors’ reasons: ‘Through processes of socialisation they
shape actors’ deﬁnitions ofwho they are andwhat theywant; and throughprocesses
of public justiﬁcation they frame logics of argument’ (p. 22). The book illustrates
this by analyzing the role of law indifferent areas, varying from ‘easy cases’ for social
constructivism (the creation of the International Criminal Court, human rights) to
cases where neo-realists and liberal institutionalism seem to hold the strongest ar-
guments (climate change and ﬁnancial institutions) and areaswhich seem to afﬁrm
the validity of traditional realism (use of force and international security). In all
these areas, the book demonstrates, the mutually constitutive relationship of law
and politics is at work.
At some points the book echoes all too familiar debates in (international) legal
theory: the relation between law as a system of rules and law as a social process, the
impact of external perspectives on law on the internal validity of legal arguments,
the autonomy of law and its dependency on politics, the logic of legal argument
and the indeterminacy of law, and so on. It would be unrealistic to expect social
constructivism to shed new light on all these age-old problems of international
law. Yet The Politics of International Law (like social constructivism in general) has
something tooffer tobothpractitionersandtheoreticiansof international law:anew
perspective on the functioning of politics, a richer understanding of the function
of law in international society, and a more sophisticated approach to some of the
foundational concepts of the international legal system.
The Politics of International Law is based on a conception of politics as a form of hu-
man action and deliberation. Political deliberation, the book argues, integrates four
2. C. Reus-Smit, ‘Politics and International Legal Obligation’, (2003) 9 (4) European Journal of International
Relations 591–625; idem, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in
International Relations (1999).
3. The best-known book in this respect is A.Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (1999).
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typesofreason: idiographic (relatedto identity),purposive,ethical, andinstrumental
reason.Bydeﬁningpolitical deliberationas anactivity combining these four typesof
reason, The Politics of International Law claims to articulate a better conception of (in-
ternational) politics than that offered by realism and liberal institutionalism – and
by other constructivist theories. And, indeed, this broadening of political rationality
has its merits and is more promising than most of the competing deﬁnitions of the
political. At the same time, however, the question remains whether the integration
of idiographic, purposive, ethical, and instrumental reason cannot be found outside
the political realm. It is, in other words, still relevant to ask, ‘If politics is a form
of normative reason and action, how does it differ from other conceptions?’ (p. 23).
In this context it would be interesting to see how social constructivism would deal
with probably the most thorough attempt to determine the realm of politics: Carl
Schmitt’s deﬁnition of the political as dealing with the determination of the public
enemy.4 Schmitt’s approach to the political containsmany aspects that could easily
be framed in constructivist terms. An example is Schmitt’s analysis of the changing
identities of warring parties due to the constitutive changes that took place in inter-
national law in the twentieth century: from the Jus Publicum Europaeum, where war
was seenas aduel between formally equal states, to the ageof collectivization,where
the boundaries between war and law-enforcing operations on behalf of the inter-
national communitybecameblurred. This blurringhad important consequences for
the distinctionbetween lawful combatants on the onehand and criminals (outlaws)
on the other.
The Politics of International Law is also based on a constructivist understanding
of the nature of international law. Following the reading of international law’s
history in The Moral Purpose of the State,5 modern international law is understood
as the result of the constitutive changes that took place in international society
during the nineteenth century. This structure was closely bound up with the rise
of political liberalism and changing ideas of the identity and purpose of states. This
has resulted, the book argues, in an emphasis on institutional autonomy, procedural
justice, multilateral forms of legislation, and a speciﬁc structure of obligation. As
far as this last is concerned, The Politics of International Law pours cold water on the
traditional positivist understanding of state consent as the basis of international
legal obligations. If state consent, as has been recognized by legal positivism itself,
is not a natural fact but an institutional concept, it is necessary to examine the
broader constitutional framework in which this institution of consent became so
prominent.Thegrowingimportanceof stateconsent, thebookargues, isnotsomuch
a ‘positivist turn’ in international law as an example of the gradual ascendancy of
liberalism.
The broadening of the concepts of ‘the political’ and ‘international law’ makes it
possible to take a fresh look at some problems in international law. A good example
is offered by Dino Kritsiotis’s analysis of the prohibition of the use of force in
international law and society. Kritsiotis rejects attempts to reduce law to politics.
4. C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (1996), translation ofDer Begriff des Politischen (1934).
5. Reus-Smit (1999), supra note 2.
846 BOOK REVIEWS
Througha studyof thedevelopment of the legal regimeon theuse of force,Kritsiotis
demonstrates that international practice attaches great value to the autonomy of
law: ‘Our ﬁndings suggest that states have rejected generalised accounts which seek
to equate all law with political action or which seek to hierarchise law and politics
in relation to each other’ (p. 47). At the same time, however, he criticizes the naive
image of law as a system of rules that is applied to facts. Law takes many forms and
fulﬁls many functions, while the relationship between law and politics differs in
various contexts. Kritsiotis illustrates this point by examining the development of
the prohibition on the use of force, from the interwar ban on war to the general
prohibition laid down in theUNCharter.Moreover, he shows that, if it comes to the
exceptions to the use of force, international law should be regarded as a discourse,
where statesbring inandassess argumentsandwhere ‘international lawcandevelop
and store its own “self-knowledge”, working practices, and international conditions
for regulating the use of force’ (p. 49).
Kritsiotis’s analysis of international law as an autonomous sphere with various
types of discursive activities is closely related to some contemporary legal theories.
Institutional theories of law, for example, have argued against the traditional image
of law as consisting of norms of conduct and power-conferring norms. In principle,
these theories argue, all results of human (linguistic) activity can obtain validity
in the legal system. In legal discourses we indeed ﬁnd those results, varying from
traditional bindingnorms to expressions of identities, emotions, historical contexts,
hortatory norms, and so on. Legal semiotics too has criticized the prioritization of
norms of conduct in legal thinking and drawn attention to the richness of legal
discourse. Until now, however, social constructivism seems not to have integrated
these insights into its thinking on the relationship between law and politics. Here, I
think, lies a promising ﬁeld for further co-operation between international lawyers
and IR theorists interested in the mutually constitutive relationship between law
and politics.
A second illustration of a fresh look at problems of international law and politics
is given by Richard Price’s analysis of customary law. Price argues for a different
understanding of the notion of ‘state practice’ in the determination of a rule of
customary law. Price proposes a more communitarian interpretation of customary
law to the effect that ‘itmaybe reasonable to claimcustomary status fornormswhen
the proscribed practice is sufﬁciently politicised to signiﬁcantly raise the threshold
for violations, so much so that the burden of proof clearly is reversed in favour of
a general rule of non-use’ (p. 123). Even when a norm falls short of this threshold,
this does notmean that it is irrelevant from a legal perspective. Price illustrates this
point bymeans of an analysis of the norm prohibiting the use, transfer, production,
and stockpiling of anti-personnel land-mines. Although the customary status of
this norm is debatable, it still has shaped the idiographic, purposive, ethical, and
instrumental reasons of states. The norm has helped to deﬁne what counts as a
‘law-abidingmember of good standing in the international community’ (p. 110).
One of the problems with Price’s approach is the primary task he assigns to
judges in the determination of rules of customary law. It is, says Price, ‘the process
of jurists’ decisions that marks a key transition to customary law’ (p. 128). Such an
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approach echoes earlier hopes of international lawyers as the ‘legal consciousness
of the civilized world’6 and reinforces some of the realist critiques of proposals for
the legalization ofworld politics. Still, Price’s interpretation of customary law offers
a good starting point for going beyond a positivist understanding of international
obligations without having to give up the autonomous sphere of law.
Social constructivismhas become one of the leading approaches to international
relations. In contrast to realism, liberalism, and (neo-)institutionalism, however,
social constructivism has remained relatively unknown to international law. There
is no heavily debated ‘dual agenda’7 to bring together international law and IR
theory on the basis of a constructivist approach. This is surprising, because social
constructivism has always emphasized the constitutive and regulative role of law
in international society. It goes not only beyond the realist marginalization of in-
ternational law, but also beyond attempts to conceptualize law solely in terms of
constraint on state actions.Whoever is interested in the potentialities andproblems
of this approach to international law and international politics should read The
Politics of International Law.
Wouter G.Werner *
6. See M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (2002), ch. 1.
7. A.-M. Slaughter Burley, ‘International Law and International Relations: A Dual Agenda’, (1993) 87 AJIL
205–39.
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